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The increasing integration of patient-speciﬁc genomic data into clinical practice and research raises serious privacy concerns.
Various systems have been proposed that protect privacy by removing or encrypting explicitly identifying information, such as name
or social security number, into pseudonyms. Though these systems claim to protect identity from being disclosed, they lack formal
proofs. In this paper, we study the erosion of privacy when genomic data, either pseudonymous or data believed to be anonymous,
are released into a distributed healthcare environment. Several algorithms are introduced, collectively called RE-Identiﬁcation of
Data In Trails (REIDIT), which link genomic data to named individuals in publicly available records by leveraging unique features
in patient-location visit patterns. Algorithmic proofs of re-identiﬁcation are developed and we demonstrate, with experiments on
real-world data, that susceptibility to re-identiﬁcation is neither trivial nor the result of bizarre isolated occurrences. We propose
that such techniques can be applied as system tests of privacy protection capabilities.
 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Modern medicine is currently in the midst of a ge-
nomics revolution that promises signiﬁcant opportuni-
ties for healthcare advancement [1,2]. At the same time,
the increased incorporation of genomic data into med-
ical records and the subsequent sharing of such data
raise complex patient privacy issues. These issues have
yet to be suﬃciently addressed by the biomedical com-
munity. In general, the term privacy is semantically
overloaded and now encompasses many distinct topics,
which makes discussions of privacy both confusing
and diﬃcult to resolve. To be speciﬁc, this work ad-
dresses anonymity, a component of privacy concerning
the control of identity, from the scientiﬁc perspective.* Corresponding author. Fax: 1-412-268-6708.
E-mail address: malin@cs.cmu.edu (B. Malin).
1532-0464/$ - see front matter  2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jbi.2004.04.005It provides provable assurances about data anonymity,
such that data cannot be related to the identities to
whom the data corresponds. For the most part, it ne-
glects security components and policy decisions aﬃli-
ated with privacy protection, which have been discussed
elsewhere [3–5].
Recently, several identity protection solutions have
been proposed to address the problem of anonymity.
Many methods advocate the use of encrypted pseud-
onyms [6,7] or the de-identiﬁcation [8,9] of explicit
identiﬁers, such as name or social security number, ini-
tially associated with genomic data. However, these
solutions lack proofs or guarantees of privacy aﬀorded
to the protected data. Contrary to popular belief, the
protection of a patients anonymity in genomic data is
not as simple as removing, or replacing, explicit identi-
fying attributes. Though genomic data may look anon-
ymous, anonymity can only be guaranteed when
inferences that can be garnered from genomic data itself
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tion prevent the direct linking of genomic data to ex-
plicit identity, research presented in this paper contends
that they provide a false appearance of anonymity.
Speciﬁcally, this work is concerned with genomic data
scattered across a set of locations. In a distributed data
sharing environment, patients visit and leave behind
data at multiple data-collecting locations, such as hos-
pitals. Each location may sever genomic data from
clinical data and, subsequently, release genomic data in
order to enable such endeavors as basic research [10,11].
It is in this environment, where we prove that the ano-
nymity of the genomic data can be compromised.1 We
develop and evaluate a general technique for re-identi-
fying seemingly anonymous genomic data to the named
individuals that the data were derived from. In actuality,
our re-identiﬁcation techniques can be applied in many
other real-world environments in which the re-identiﬁ-
cation within can be applied. For example, the online
realm is another distributed environment, in which IP
addresses can be re-identiﬁed to named individuals.
However, each environment that is potentially suscep-
tible to our methods is deﬁned by its own set of complex
socio-technological interactions, including legal protec-
tions, the ability for data collection, and controls on
data sharing. To discuss and prove the existence of a
trail re-identiﬁcation concern for a diﬀerent environ-
ment, such as for health or another type of data, it must
be analyzed in light of the environmental policies,
oversight, methods of sharing, and data availabilities.
Thus, this paper addresses the features that enable re-
identiﬁcation to occur for genomic data.
Our work serves two main purposes. First, it raises
awareness that anonymity protection methods must
account for healthcare and medical inferences that exist
in a data sharing environment. Second, this work pro-
vides the biomedical community with a formal compu-
tational model of a re-identiﬁcation problem that
pertains to genomic data. We believe that our models, as
well as others [13,14], can be applied as tests of the
privacy protection capabilities of existing and develop-
ing privacy protection systems.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In the following section, we present some deﬁciencies in
current protection methods, as well as discuss the extent
to which Institutional Review Boards and Data Use
Agreements are applicable (and the lack thereof). Next,
in Section 3, we review and formalize a simple model of1 This research does not explicitly consider the environment of
clinical trials [12] are under more scrutiny, with tighter control and
oversight. In clinical trials, researchers are often required to indicate
any intent to link genomic data with other types of data, including
identifying information. Though such protocols do not prevent
researchers from employing our model of re-identiﬁcation, there is a
much lesser concern that such a use would occur.re-identiﬁcation that this work builds upon. Then, in
Section 4, re-identiﬁcation methods are formalized as a
family of computational algorithms. In Section 5, we
analyze how the algorithms perform with real-world
data. Finally, in Section 6 we discuss the limitations,
possible extensions of our methods, and how this work
can help researchers design more adequate anonymity
protection techniques.2. Background
There are several reasons why current privacy pro-
tection methods fail to suﬃciently protect the anonymity
of genomic data. One reason for this failure is that
current methods neglect to protect identifying inferences
drawn from the genomic data itself. A second reason
concerns the ability to relate genomic information to
other publicly available information.
2.1. Previous related research
The ability to infer identifying features from genomic
data is exempliﬁed by our prior research into genotype–
clinical phenotype relations. We developed a general
model with the capability of learning patient-speciﬁc
genomic data from publicly available longitudinal
medical information [15]. The model relates a diseases
symptoms to particular clinical states of the disease.
Appropriate weighting of the symptoms is learned from
observed diagnoses to subsequently identify the state of
the disease presented in hospital visits. This approach is
applicable to any simple genetic disorder with deﬁned
clinical phenotypes. The eﬃcacy of our model was
demonstrated by inferring speciﬁc DNA mutations of
clinically positive Huntingtons disease patients. Specif-
ically, our model utilized existing knowledge about the
strong inverse correlation between the disease age of
onset and the number of CAG repeat mutations in the
HD gene.
In other previous research, we presented a speciﬁc
scenario where genomic data, devoid of any identiﬁers,
was uniquely re-identiﬁed, through an algorithm called
RE-Identiﬁcation DNA (REID), to the name and de-
mographics of the patients that the data were collected
from [16]. The REID algorithm exploits what we now
refer to as the trail generated by occurrences of the data
across independent hospitals. Releasing the genomic
data alone, even devoid of pseudonyms, provides no
guarantee of anonymity because the locations at which
the genomic data appear can be compared to occur-
rences of patients at hospitals using hospital discharge
data [17]. These trails of genomic data and trails of
patient appearances in medical data can match uniquely.
However, the REID algorithm is limited in its scope
because genomic data re-identiﬁcation can occur only if
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we both generalize our original re-identiﬁcation tech-
nique and introduce a family of trail re-identiﬁcation
methods that relax these assumptions for more general
applicability.
2.2. Genomic data, IRBs, and DUAs
When genomic data are shared, it may or may not be
the case that a data use agreement (DUA) is required.
This requirement is dependent on whether or not the
data are provided under ‘‘research purposes’’ as speci-
ﬁed by Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
(HIPAA) Privacy Rule. For example, collections of
hospital discharge data are not subject to HIPAA pro-
tections, since the governing body over this type of in-
formation is not considered a ‘‘covered entity.’’
Moreover, HIPAA does not explicitly classify DNA-
based data (e.g., sequence data, expression microarrays)
as an identifying attribute of a patient. Arguably, DNA
data could be released under the Safe Harbor provision
of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.
When considering the genomic data, we need to
clarify what the data sharing environment is. For in-
stance, when a dataset is made publicly available it is not
subject to IRB review, nor are DUAs required. We have
already seen the advent of a handful of public use DNA
datasets, such as the National Center for Biotechnol-
ogys PopSet database. These types of collections cir-
cumvent the issues of ‘‘attendant protections’’ and
‘‘Institutional Review Board (IRB) oversight,’’ since the
data are already on publicly available websites. How-
ever, in certain cases, we recognize that these modes of
sharing might severely limit access or availability to
genomic data for more complex research and analysis.
In contrast, if DNA data are to be (1) shared for
research purposes and (2) subject to HIPAA Privacy
Rule constraints, then a DUA is required. In addition,
an IRB approval is required if the research is federally
funded. Yet, one of the exemptions to oversight an IRB
will provide is if the data are believed to be anonymous.
Thus, if DNA data are found to be potentially vulner-
able to re-identiﬁcation methods, such as those in this
paper, then the DUA and IRB protections may be
forced to be strengthened.
As stated, it is not the case that a DUA and IRB
approval are required. However, even when these are
required, they may base their decision on false beliefs
about the identiﬁability of the data. Thus, there is no
guarantee that the data, which has been subject to a
DUA and IRB review alone, are protected suﬃciently
from re-identiﬁcation methods. While it is true that re-
identiﬁcation may be prohibited in the DUA, as a policy
it is not suﬃcient to prevent someone (i.e., a malicious
employee) from re-identiﬁcation. Our argument is that
policy is strengthened when complemented by technol-ogy to ensure more controllable and enforceable pro-
tection. Rather than harp on the extent to which the
IRB and DUA delegate responsible research, it is better
to address policy infused with technology.3. Data model
The re-identiﬁcation algorithms are best understood
by structuring the data released by data holders. In this
section we discuss the process by which data are orga-
nized and the properties that appear in the resulting data
structures. We begin with an example of a data col-
lecting and sharing example.
3.1. Scenario
Consider the following situation. John Smith is ad-
mitted to a local hospital, where he is diagnosed, via a
DNA diagnostic test, with a DNA-inﬂuenced disease,
such as cystic ﬁbrosis. The hospital stores the clinical
and DNA information in Johns electronic medical re-
cord. For treatment, John visits several other hospitals,
where his electronic medical record is also collected and
stored. For research purposes, the hospitals forward
certain DNA databases, including Johns DNA, onto a
research group [1,2]. The DNA records are tagged with
the submitting institution and with pseudonyms for their
submitted sequences [9]. By state law, the hospital sends
a copy of the identiﬁed discharge record, including
name, gender, zip code, visit date diagnoses, and pro-
cedures, onto a state-controlled database. The discharge
database is made publicly available in a de-identiﬁed
format and can be re-identiﬁed to publicly available
records, such as voter registration databases [13,18,19].
This ﬁnal step of linking is based on the uniqueness of
demographics, which has been validated in previous
data privacy research, as well as in demography, public
health, and epidemiology communities [20,21]. The
availability and potential of re-identiﬁcation remain
even under the new medical privacy resolutions,
including HIPAA. As a result, we can track which
hospitals John visited in the discharge data and we can
track his DNA information in the research data. The
sets of locations John visited we call a trail, and unique
features of trails allow DNA trails in the research data
to be matched to trails from their identiﬁed discharge
database counterparts.
3.2. Basic model
The basic model elements are derived from relational
database theory. The term data refers to information
held by a data-collecting location, such as a hospital.
The data are organized as a table sðA1;A2; . . . ;ApÞ, with
attributes A ¼ fA1;A2; . . . ;Apg. Each row is a p-tuple
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resents the sequence of values, a1 2 A1; . . . ; ap 2 Ap. The
size of the table is simply the number of tuples and is
represented jsj. In our model, each data-collecting lo-
cation releases its data table as two separate tables of
information. The ﬁrst table, sþ, is called the identiﬁed
subtable and contains explicitly identiﬁed data (e.g.,
name, address, social security number, etc.) with attri-
butes Aþ, where Aþ  A. The second table, s, is called
the DNA subtable and consists of DNA information
only, with attributes A  A.
As an example, consider the database records in
Fig. 1, where generic clinical data are stored in sþ and
electronic DNA sequences are stored in s. Notice that
at the location housing the database the relationships
between DNA and identities is explicitly known, while
in the partitioned release the order of the tuples may be
changed.
Before continuing, several assumptions about the
environment should be made evident. First, it is as-
sumed that each data-collecting location releases data
collected by itself and from no external source. There-
fore, it is not possible for hospital H to release the DNA
sequences of patient X if patient X never visited hospital
H. Second, tuples released in the de-identiﬁed and
identiﬁed tables are unique for each patient. Though a
patient may visit a hospital on multiple occasions, the
information released by the hospital corresponds to a
patient, but not to the frequency of the patients visits to
a hospital.
3.3. Data structures
The static nature of patient demographics and ge-
nomic information allows for data to be followed across
releases from diﬀerent locations. We make the tracking
of data explicit by constructing two matrices. The ﬁrst
matrix is called the DNA track N, and consists of in-
formation pertaining to shared DNA data. The dimen-
sions of this matrix are j [c2C sc j  (jAj þ jCj) and each
row in this matrix corresponds to a unique DNA sample
released by the set of locations. The cells of the ﬁrst jAj
columns of the matrix represent the DNA informationFig. 1. Table s is the data collection of a speciﬁc location and consists of all d
of s in the ﬁgure results in two subtables: an identiﬁed table sþ of patient d
There is no reason that the ordering of the rows in sþ and s must be the same
s in the original table s.collected from sc . The latter jCj cells are Boolean rep-
resentations of the DNA data at each location. Values
associated with the locations are 1 if the DNA sample
was released from the location and 0 otherwise. The
second matrix is called the identified track P and is
similar to the ﬁrst matrix, except it maintains a repre-
sentation of the identiﬁed data in the ﬁrst jAþj cells. For
a more concrete example, the data releases of three lo-
cations and the corresponding tracks P and N are pro-
vided in Fig. 2.
When every location releases tables, such that the
only tuples present in s have corresponding tuples in
sþ, and vice versa, we say that the tracks are unreserved.
The tracks P and N in Fig. 2 are unreserved. However,
both data releasers and patients are autonomous enti-
ties, and either can choose to withhold certain infor-
mation. Thus, releases that are unreserved are not
always practical and, at times, can be impossible to
achieve. Consequently, we say that track N is reserved to
track P if for every location c, for each tuple x 2 sc
there exists a tuple y 2 sþc , such that both x and y are
derived from the same tuple in s. Similarly, P can be
reserved to track N. By substituting c03 for c3, in Fig. 2,
the DNA track N0 is reserved to the identiﬁed track P.
The vector of binary values associated with the latter
jCj attributes we refer to as a trail. We denote a trail for
data d in an arbitrary track T as trail (T,d). When a trail
resides in an unreserved track, it is called a complete trail
because the binary values unambiguously convey the
presence or absence of a patient at a location. When a
trail exists in a reserved track (e.g.,N0 of Fig. 2) it is called
an incomplete trail, since the value of 0 is ambiguous.
Through the ambiguity present in the 0 value, there is
a simple relationship between a patients incomplete trail
and complete trail. We say that a trail x is a subtrail of
trail y (x6 y) if for every value of 1 in x, there is a value
of 1 in y. Similarly, y is the supertrail of x. The ambiguity
prevents a direct mapping of an incomplete trail in one
track to its complete trail in the other track. This is
because, given an incomplete trail made up of n
locations with m 0s, there are 2m potential complete
trails that the incomplete trail could be mapped to. For
example, using tracksP andN0 fromFig. 2, cttg. . .a[0,1,0]epicted attributed Name, Birthdate, . . ., DNA. The vertical partitioning
emographics and a DNA table s containing de-identiﬁed sequences.
as in s. The arrows specify the truth about which tuples of sþ belong to
Fig. 2. (Left) Identiﬁed (P) and DNA (N) tracks created from unreserved releases of three locations c1, c2, and c3. Both P and N are unreserved
tracks. (Right) Resulting DNA track N0 is created from the substitution of the reserved release from c03 for the unreserved release of c3. As a result of
this substitution, N0 is reserved to P.
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John[1,1,0] and Bob[0,1,1] are supertrails of cttg. . .a
[0,1,0].
We have now described the data sharing environ-
ment, the data structures, and their formal properties. In
the following section, we provide a set of algorithms that
utilize these data structures and properties for re-iden-
tiﬁcation purposes.Table 1
Classiﬁcation of re-identiﬁcations made by REIDIT-C
Re-identiﬁcation No re-identiﬁcation
trail(N, n) ¼ trail(P, p) Correct match False non-match
trail(N, n) 6¼ trail(P, p) False match Correct non-match
The ﬁrst and second rows of the contingency table correspond to
outcomes for when the considered trails are equivalent or not,
respectively. Light-shaded cells are possible outcomes and the dark-
ened cell is an impossible outcome.4. Re-identiﬁcation algorithms
Given the tracks constructed above, the trail re-iden-
tiﬁcation problem is how to properly and uniquely link
identiﬁed data to DNA data through common features in
their trails. In this section we will provide algorithms for
doing exactly this. The two algorithms presented in this
section are collectively termed Re-identiﬁcation of Data
in Trails (REIDIT), since each exploits a diﬀerent aspect
of the relationships between trails.
4.1. REIDIT-Complete
The ﬁrst re-identiﬁcation algorithm is called REIDIT-
Complete, or REIDIT-C, which performs exactmatchingFig. 3. Pseudocode for the Ron the trails in tracksN andP. It assumes that bothN and
P are unreserved, and therefore, is only applicable with
complete trails. The pseudocode of REIDIT-C is
provided in Fig. 3. For every tuple n 2 N, REIDIT-C
determines if there exists one and only one tuple p 2 P
such that trail(N,n) equals trail(P,p). When there is an
exact and unique match, then the genomic data of
trail(N,n) are re-identiﬁed to explicitly identifying
information in P. If trail(N,n) is equivalent to both
trail(P,p) and trail(P,p0), where p 6¼ p0, then there is an
ambiguity and no re-identiﬁcation can occur.
REIDIT-C can generate the four possible results for
two arbitrary trails trail(N,n) and trail(P,p), as shown in
Table 1: (1) correct match, (2) correct non-match, (3)
false non-match, and (4) false match. The ﬁrst three canEIDIT-C algorithm.
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follows. One of the main assumptions of the unreserved-
release model is that both trails in P and N are complete.
This allows for several directly applicable implications.
First, it implies that for each trail in P, there must exist a
minimum of one equivalent trail in N. In turn, by the
deﬁnition of a complete trail, a correct match can only
be made when trail(N,n)  trail(P,p). When there is only
one equivalent trail in N for trail(P,p), as well as only
one equivalent trail in P for trail(N,n), then this must be
a correct match. In the event that, there are multiple
equivalent trails, then for trail(N,n) there will be a set of
equivalent trails in P, one of which must be a correct
match. Since the correct trail is indistinguishable from
the incorrect trails, no match will be made. To prevent a
false match from being assigned, a false non-match will
occur. Finally, when trail(N,n) 6¼ trail(P,p), then the two
trails cannot refer to the same entity, and thus a correct
non-match will be made.
The computational complexity of REIDIT-C, as
presented in Fig. 3, is quadratic in the size of the DNA
table, O(jNj2). We can count the number of steps as
follows. First, the outer loop iterates over all of the tu-
ples in N, which is jNj iterations. Second, for each it-
eration in N, the algorithm iterates a maximum of jPj
times. This provides O(jNj d jPj), which equals O(jNj2)
because jNj ¼ jPj. However, the quadratic bound is an
artifact of the way in which the pseudocode is written.
Another version based on sorting could be written, suchFig. 4. Pseudocode for REIDIT-I-Fast, a variant othat both sets of trails are sorted and then compared.
Though more complex in the data structure, the new
version would produce a complexity bound of
O(jNj log jNj).
4.2. REIDIT-Incomplete
The second re-identiﬁcation algorithm is named
REIDIT-Incomplete, or REIDIT-I. It is applicable
when one track is reserved to the other. Fig. 4 provides
pseudocode and commentary for a variant of the algo-
rithm.
The basic implementation of the algorithm works as
follows. For each trail in the track containing incom-
plete trails, the set of its supertrails from the other track
is determined. If there is only one supertrail, then a
correct re-identiﬁcation has occurred. The re-identiﬁed
trails from N and from P are then removed. The re-
moval of the re-identiﬁed trails is a crucial step. Since
the complete trail can have multiple subtrails, failure to
remove the trail from consideration can prevent addi-
tional trails from being re-identiﬁed. This process con-
tinues until no more re-identiﬁcations can be made
because one of two conditions is satisﬁed: either (1) the
track with incomplete trails has no more trails to process
or (2) there are no re-identiﬁcations made in the current
iteration.
REIDIT-I can generate the four possible results for
two arbitrary trails trail(N,n) and trail(P,p), as shown inf REIDIT-I, with an eﬃcient data structure.
Table 2




Correct match False non-match
Not(trail(N, n))
6trail(P, p)
False match Correct non-match
The ﬁrst and second rows of the contingency table correspond to
outcomes for when the subtrail property is satisﬁed and not satisﬁed,
respectively. Light-shaded cells are possible outcomes and the dark-
ened cell is an impossible outcome.
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false non-match, and (4) false match. The ﬁrst three can
occur, while the last is impossible. The reasoning is as
follows. One of the main assumptions of the reserved-
release model is that trails in N are incomplete, which
means that only the 1s of the trails can be trusted.
Regardless, it must be true that for an arbitrary trail in
N, there must exist a non-null set of supertrails in P. If
the set of supertrails is of size one, then this must be a
correct match. In the event that there are multiple sub-
trails no re-identiﬁcation will be made in the current
iteration. Yet, in the current, and subsequent iterations,
the set size may be reduced. The minimum set size is
equal to 1, since there must exist at least one supertrail
for the trail in question. When the set size does equal 1,
then a correct re-identiﬁcation will be made. If the set
size cannot be reduced to 1, then a false non-match will
occur. In the case that trail(N,n) is not a subtrail of
trail(P,p), it is not possible for a re-identiﬁcation to be
made. Thus, for any two trails trail(N,n) and trail(P,p),
where trail(N,n) is not a subtrail of trail(P,p), only true
non-matches will be recorded.
For a complexity analysis of REIDIT-I, let N be re-
served to P. From a computational standpoint, the
REIDIT-I algorithm is the basic structure of REIDIT-C
with an additional outer loop. Thus, by a simple ex-
tension to the complexity proof of REIDIT-C, we can
potentially iterate jNj times, and it appears that the
complexity of REIDIT-I is O(jNj2 d jPj). However, we
can abstract information in such a way that the com-
plexity can be reduced to O(jNj d jPj). This method we
call REIDIT-I-Fast and which is depicted in Fig. 4.
Consider an adjacency matrix Z of size jNj  jPj,
where each cell Z[n,p] has a value of 1 if trail(N,n) 6trail
(P,p). In addition, let S be a column vector of size jNj
where each cell is the rowsum of Z. Construction of the
matrix and vector occurs in approximately O(jNj d jPj)
steps. In the do-while loop, theworst-case scenario occurs
when each iteration yields one re-identiﬁcation, thus
taking jNj iterations.Within the loop, a sequential scan of
the S vector takes place in jNj steps. If a unique re-iden-
tiﬁcation is found, realized when S[x] is 1, then a scan of
one row of the Z matrix occurs using the inner for loop;
this takes jPj steps.When cellZ[x,y] with value 1 is found,the found column inZ and theS vector are updatedwith a
scan taking jNj steps. Since, in worst case there is only one
re-identiﬁcation per do-while iteration, this process only
occurs once per iteration. Thus, the total number of steps
for the while loop and its internal processes is approxi-
mately jNj d (2 d jNj þ jPj), which is approximately
O(jNj2 þ jPj d jNj). Therefore, the order of complexity
will be O(setup) + O(scanning) and since jPjP jNj, com-
plexity is O(jNj d jPj).
4.3. Upper bounds
Since a trail is vector of Boolean values, the set of
trails can be discussed in terms of binary strings. For
both REIDIT-C and REIDIT-I, the maximum number
of trail re-identiﬁcations is dependent on the number of
permutations of a binary string. Let C be the set of data
releasing location and P be the identiﬁed track. The
maximum number of trail re-identiﬁcations is bounded
by the minimum of jPj and 2jCj  1. When jPj6 2jCj  1,
then the maximum number of trail re-identiﬁcations is
bounded by jPj, which is the number of distinct patients
in the considered population. This implicates that all
trails may be re-identiﬁed. When jPj > 2jCj  1, the
maximum number of trail re-identiﬁcations is bounded
by the number of diﬀerent binary location visit patterns
that can be generated from jCj locations.5. Experiments
Though in theory the re-identiﬁcation limits of REI-
DIT-C and -I scale exponentially, this does not typically
occur in the real world. A main contributing factor is
that people do not visit locations in a random manner.
On the contrary, many healthcare factors inﬂuence
where an individual leaves data behind. For example,
many hospitals have referral programs, such that there
is non-trivial correlation between the visits of several
hospital visits. Moreover, people tend to visit hospitals
that are within close proximity to their residence. A
hospital that is situated in the middle of a city will see
more patients than a hospital in a rural setting. In ad-
dition, certain hospitals oﬀer specialized care or treat-
ment for particular diseases. Given these, and additional
idiosyncrasies of the real world, REIDIT must be eval-
uated with real health data.
5.1. Description of real-world data
The dataset used for evaluation consists of publicly
available hospital discharge data from the State of Illi-
nois, for the years 1990–1997. There are approximately
1.3 million hospital discharges per year and collection
has compliance with greater than 99% of discharges
occurring in hospitals in the state [22]. Typical discharge
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mation. The demographic data include date of birth,
gender, zip code of residence, and hospital visited, while
clinical information per patient visit includes a set of one
to nine International Classiﬁcation of Disease, Version 9
(ICD-9) codes and procedure codes.
From the discharge databases, longitudinal medical
proﬁles for patients diagnosed with genetic disorders
were constructed as follows. First, the set of patients
that were diagnosed with a single gene disease was de-
termined. A patient was represented by a distinct com-
bination of the demographic values {date of birth,
gender, and ﬁve digit zip code}. Next, the databases were
requeried with the previous demographic data to append
additional clinical information from other hospital vis-
its. Proﬁles were then probabilistically merged based on
census demographics for {age, gender, zip code}, such
that proﬁles likely to relate to the same person were
combined. The uniqueness of patient identities making
up proﬁles was 98–100% based on census data as re-
ported previously [20]. Demographic data are consid-
ered to be identifying information, since each unique
patient can be re-identiﬁed by simple linkage on demo-
graphics to publicly available identiﬁed data, such as
voter registration lists [13,19,21]. In prior research we
discovered that standard ICD-9 codes leak DNA-related
data [23], such as genetic disorders and gender. We
utilize both of these features in our analysis.
5.2. Re-identiﬁability with REIDIT-C
Eight populations aﬄicted with single gene disorders
are analyzed. These populations are cystic ﬁbrosis (CF),
Friedrichs Ataxia (FA), hereditary hemorrhagic tele-
ganictasia (HT), Huntingtons disease (HD), phenylke-
tonuria (PK), Refsums disease (RD), sickle cell anemia
(SC), and tuberous sclerosis (TS). Though more com-
mon diseases have less well-deﬁned genotype–phenotype
relations, this does not diminish the fact that both DNA
and identiﬁed data form trails of data left behind. Trail
re-identiﬁcation does not require a known relationship
between the DNA and the phenotype, since the methods
are independent of speciﬁc genotype–phenotype rela-
tionships. The trail problem only requires that DNA
and identity be tracked over multiple locations. The
reasoning behind the use of rare diseases for algorithm
analysis is for the construction of multiple datasets for
testing. In this respect, our use of such subpopulations
are neither exaggerated nor contrived. It is true that if
trail re-identiﬁcation was performed over genomic data
collected on individuals with more complex, or poly-
genic, genetic diseases, then we could not use such a
blocking strategy to add the additional classifying in-
formation of which speciﬁc disease a genomic data
sample, or a health information, corresponds to. How-
ever, since one of the main goals of biomedical researchis to learn and formally characterize these complex ge-
notype–phenotype relationships, then trail re-identiﬁ-
cation for these diseases will become akin studies we
have performed on rare diseases.
To evaluate re-identiﬁcation with REIDIT-C, we
make the following assumption about patient data. It is
assumed that if a discharge proﬁle speciﬁes a patient
made a visit to a particular hospital, then both clinical
and DNA data are released by the hospital about the
patient. REIDIT-C was used with the set of proﬁles for
each of the eight populations and gender-speciﬁc sub-
populations. As speciﬁed in the previous section, all re-
identiﬁcations returned by REIDIT-C are a correct
match. The results are presented in Table 3.
Since, the number of patients, for each population, is
less than two to the number of total hospitals visited, the
maximum number of re-identiﬁcations in theory is the
number of patients. However, the observed number of
re-identiﬁcations only achieves this maximum for the
RD population, where there is only one patient with the
disease at each of the hospitals considered. For the re-
maining populations, it appears that healthcare factors
have a profound eﬀect on the uniqueness of trails. A
quick inspection reveals that the re-identiﬁability of
these populations is related to the average number of
patients visiting a hospital. This eﬀect is graphically
depicted in Fig. 5. It is apparent that as the number of
people per hospital increases, the more diﬃcult it is for
re-identiﬁcations to occur. This phenomenon is due, in
part, to the fact that an increase in population size, over
a ﬁxed set of locations, increases the probability that
multiple patients will have the same trail. The average
number of patients per hospital is a gross measure of re-
identiﬁcation. There are additional features about the
environment that aﬀect the re-identiﬁability of a popu-
lation, which we expect to explore in future studies.
The belief that each location in a health environment
will collect and release genomic data may be unrealistic
given the current state of the healthcare market. Though
such an environment may exist in the future, we must
consider a more ﬁne-grained perspective by analyzing
how particular locations and sets of locations can aﬀect
the re-identiﬁability of patients in a population. It is
more realistic that only a fraction of hospitals will be
releasing genomic data about patients. As exempliﬁed in
Fig. 5, the number of patients per location aﬀects re-
identiﬁability. Yet, this does not indicate which loca-
tions have an eﬀect. To answer this question, we study
the eﬀect of location popularity on re-identiﬁability of a
population. We investigate the case where a certain set
of locations are releasing data. More speciﬁcally, as can
be seen in Fig. 6, we consider an environment where an
increasing number of hospitals participate in unreserved
data sharing. We compare the re-identiﬁability for CF,
where the number of patients per location is relatively
large (11.92), to PK, where the average is closer to a
Table 3
Summary of the percentage of actual re-identiﬁcations made by REIDIT-C for diﬀerent genetic disease patient populations







CF 1149 174 11.92 32.90
Female 557 142 7.28 43.09
Male 592 150 6.94 39.36
FA 129 105 2.08 68.99
Female 60 68 1.47 80.00
Male 69 72 1.65 78.26
HD 419 172 4.37 50.00
Female 236 149 2.76 79.14
Male 183 127 2.70 50.63
HT 429 159 4.83 52.21
Female 244 140 3.06 64.34
Male 185 114 2.98 63.24
PK 77 57 2.15 75.32
Female 52 48 1.85 80.77
Male 25 25 1.36 80.00
RD 4 8 1 100.00
Female 2 4 1 100.00
Male 2 4 1 100.00
SC 7730 207 88.89 37.34
Female 4175 189 55.87 43.76
Male 3555 191 41.01 36.51
TS 220 119 3.82 51.60
Female 97 88 2.60 78.35
Male 123 87 2.60 61.79
Fig. 5. REIDIT-C re-identiﬁcation of populations as a function of the
average number of people per location. Each genetic disease popula-
tion has three data points in the graph: genderless, males only, and
females only.
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ranked by the number of distinct patients visiting the
location. A total rank ordering of the locations was
achieved by randomly ordering locations with the same
number of patients.
Given a set of locations from highest rank, or down
to a particular rank x, we measured the re-identiﬁability
of the trails that were discovered (i.e., non-null trails
over the set of locations ranked 1 to x). For both CF
and PK, the rate of trail discovery is logarithmic as canbe seen in Fig. 6. The r2 correlation coeﬃcients for ﬁt
curves were 0.92 and 0.97, respectively. However, while
the rate of trail re-identiﬁcation for CF is logarithmic,
the rate for PK is linear. It appears that this is an artifact
of the slope in the logarithmic discovery rate. The slope
of trail discovery for CF is much greater than for PK.
This implies that most individuals visited the more
popular locations for CF, while for PK patients are
more dispersed in hospitals.
One would expect that incorporation of less popular
locations would make re-identiﬁcation easier and that
more popular locations would make re-identiﬁcation
more diﬃcult. To evaluate this claim, we added loca-
tions in reverse rank, and measured the re-identiﬁability
of the non-null trails constructed from the contributing
locations. We ﬁnd that for the ﬁrst quarter of reverse
rank websites, almost all patients in the population are
re-identiﬁed. This is due to the fact that for most of these
hospitals, the number of patient trails found and the
number of re-identiﬁcations increase approximately
linearly with slope equal to 1. This means that at these
locations, usually only one patient existed at the hospital
with the disorder. Thus, the ﬁrst part of our hypothesis
is true. After the ﬁrst quarter locations, the re-identiﬁ-
cation rate for PH remains linear, with a slightly lower
rate than the rate of trail discovery. However, the trail
Fig. 6. REIDIT-C re-identiﬁcation as a function of hospital rank by visit popularity; (ﬁrst row) in order, (second row) reverse order. Hospital visit
popularity is measured as the total number of unique visiting patients. The higher the order in the rank, the greater the popularity of a location. The
‘‘discovered’’ curve is the number of unique identiﬁed patients and unique DNA samples found in the set of locations up to rank x. The ‘‘re-
identiﬁed’’ curve is the number of re-identiﬁcations made in the trails constructed over the set of considered locations. The ‘‘theoretical’’ curve is the
maximum number of trails that could be re-identiﬁed given the number of locations and the number of trails observed.
Fig. 7. Re-identiﬁcation of CF incomplete trails with REIDIT-I as an increasing amount of identifying information is withheld from the release.
From left to right: 0.0, 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9 probability of withholding. The ‘‘identiﬁed’’ and ‘‘DNA’’ curves correspond to the number of unique
identiﬁed patients and unique DNA samples, respectively, discovered in the set of locations up to rank x. The ‘‘re-identiﬁed’’ curve represents the
number of DNA samples re-identiﬁed to identiﬁed patients.
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quently, after a delay, so too does the CF trail re-iden-
tiﬁcation rate. This is due to the fact that as the number
of people per location increases, the ability to distin-
guish a larger number of trails increases as well.
5.3. Re-identiﬁability with REIDIT-I
For analysis of REIDIT-I, we continue with the CF
population proﬁles from above. The CF complete trails
were used to generate incomplete trails for analysis of
the REIDIT-I algorithm. To do so, we utilize a simple
model of how locations create reserved releases. Each
location withholds identifying information on a patient
with the same probability p. Thus, the track of complete
information consists of identiﬁed clinical data trails and
the track of incomplete information consists of genomic
data trails. We varied the probability of information
being withheld and attempted re-identiﬁcation with
REIDIT-I. As speciﬁed in the previous section, all re-
identiﬁcations returned by REIDIT-I are a true match.
Graphs of the results for p equal to 0, 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9
are shown in Fig. 7. Each point of a graph depicts the
average result for 10 experiments of random informa-
tion withholding.
As the probability of withholding information in-
creases, the probability that an individual will not show
up at all (i.e., no trail generated) in the population of
incomplete trails. Thus, in the graphs we show three
lines. The topmost line represents the number of non-
null identiﬁed clinical data trails for a given set of
hospitals. The middle line represents the number of
non-null genomic data trails. And the lowest line
represents the number of genomic data trails that were
re-identiﬁed. As expected, we ﬁnd that as the amount of
information withheld increases, the number of releasing
locations necessary to perform re-identiﬁcation in-
creases as well. This is due to the fact that as additional
information is withheld, the incomplete trail becomes
less complex and informative. However, even though
trails become less complex, there remains a signiﬁcant
disposition toward re-identiﬁcation. This is observable
even after 50% of a trail is obscured. We ﬁnd that there
is an inverse relationship between the slope of re-iden-
tiﬁcation (as a function of website rank) and the amount
of information withheld.6. Discussion
Appearances can be deceiving. This concept has been
uttered by countless people in many diﬀerent eras, but it
characterizes genomic data as well. Simply because ge-
nomic data are de-identiﬁed or pseudonymized does not
mean that anonymity can be assumed. It is necessary
that features about the data, as well as the environmentin which the data are shared, are taken into account
before data can be declared as anonymous. The REI-
DIT algorithms described in this paper are a prime ex-
ample of how and why techniques that function in one
environment, such as the use of encryption to protect
security, cannot be blindly relied upon to protect ano-
nymity.
6.1. Privacy protection systems testing
Though privacy protection schemas do not explicitly
model protection against trail re-identiﬁcation, not all
schemas are susceptible to the attack. In this section, we
analyze and compare two protection models and their
susceptibility to trails. The ﬁrst system, proposed by de
Moor et al. [9], is susceptible, while the second, pro-
posed by deCODE Genetics [6], is not. Various privacy
protection schemas have been published and deployed
for genomic data. These methods utilize protections
such as encrypted pseudonyms provided by trusted third
parties [6,9] or de-identiﬁcation of explicit identiﬁers
[8,21,24]. Each claims that it protects the privacy of the
data subjects. While advocates of such techniques rec-
ognize that there exist re-identiﬁcation threats from in-
ferences about data itself [9], they deem such threats as
minimal and unjustiﬁable as an impediment to research.
Our experimental results demonstrate otherwise; the re-
identiﬁcation risk of de-identiﬁed data is non-trivial.
One susceptible model has been proposed by de Moor
et al. [9]. In this model, a set of data holders, such as a
set of hospitals, transfer data to a central repository
maintained by a trusted third party. Both parties en-
crypt the identifying information associated with the
DNA data. For a set of locations A, B, . . ., Z, the
trusted third party maintains a set of datasets
fAðgðfAðIdentityAÞÞ, DNAÞ, BðgðfBðIdentityBÞÞ, DNAÞ,
. . ., ZðgðfZðIdentityZÞÞ, DNAÞg, where g is the encryp-
tion function of the trusted party, fi is an encryption
function for location i, and Identityi is the set of identi-
fying attributes used by location i for the encrypted
pseudonym. When a new researcher requests sTTP for
data, sTTP supplies the appropriate set of doubly en-
crypted lists. This method protects direct access to the
identity of the individual, but completely neglects the
DNA data. A DNA track can easily be constructed
from the released information. When identiﬁed clinical
information is subsequently shared, an identiﬁed track
can also be constructed. With a DNA track and an
identiﬁed track structured from multiple locations, trail
re-identiﬁcation can be conducted. It should be noted
that masking the identity of the data location does not
necessarily prevent trail re-identiﬁcation. For example,
in Fig. 8, an unreserved release is made, but the DNA
datasets do not have locations explicitly listed. Thus, the
ordering of bits in trails for the identiﬁed and DNA
tracks are not necessarily the same. Regardless, a correct
Fig. 8. (Left) Unreserved releases where locations are not identiﬁed. The subscripts A, B, and C for identiﬁed tables have no explicit correlation with
subscripts 1, 2, and 3 of the DNA tables. (Right) Resulting identiﬁed (P) and DNA (N) tracks. Re-identiﬁcations are made through uniqueness in the
number of locations visited.
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locations visited.
The third party model can be protected against trail
re-identiﬁcation. One way to group information is to
construct a protected dataset by taking the distinct un-
ion of all locations data. In eﬀect, this removes the data
requesters ability to discern not only the identity of the
location the data were derived from, but how many lo-
cations held the data. This way, a DNA sample, such as
‘‘cttg. . .a’’ in Fig. 8, would be identical in the location-
based trail as all other DNA samples. However, though
this is a technical solution, it may not be a feasible op-
tion for the participating locations. For example, there
exist intellectual property (merging issue as well) and
research culture issues that make the creation of a cen-
tralized repository very diﬃcult. One reason why
grouping may not be feasible is that in many cases,
DNA data are not the only information shared. There
are additional data that must be taken into account,
since the most common use of DNA in the research and
clinical realm is for association studies, such as complex
phenotype correlation and pharmacogenomics. For this
reason, DNA is often accompanied by additional in-
formation in the form of some phenotypic or metabolic
observation.
In contrast, the privacy protection model proposed
by deCODE Genetics [6] of Iceland is not susceptible to
trail re-identiﬁcation. The general overview of the model
is as follows. deCODE researchers determine, with the
assistance of physicians that attend to the general pop-
ulation, a set of individuals of research interest. The set
of participating patients donate a blood sample at a
facility run by the Data Protection Commission (DPC)
of Iceland. The patients Social Security Number is en-
crypted (using strong encryption) into a pseudonym,
and is forwarded with the sample onto deCODE. In this
system, an individuals clinical information is distributed
and annotated with location information from multiple
locations, thus an identiﬁed track can be constructed.
However, an individuals DNA is collected and anno-tated with one location only. Even if there are multiple
locations run by the DPC for data collection, each in-
dividuals DNA trail will have a solitary location. Thus,
the only susceptibility this system reveals to trail re-
identiﬁcation is when a single individual visits only one
DPC location.
Protection against trail re-identiﬁcation does not
imply that the protection model is impregnable to re-
identiﬁcation. In the following section, we brieﬂy discuss
additional susceptibility tests that can be employed.
6.2. Alternative re-identiﬁcation models
Obviously, the REIDIT algorithms do not re-identify
all genomic data samples. But does this guarantee that
the unidentiﬁed data are anonymous? While it would be
nice to unequivocally proclaim yes, this would be ex-
tremely na€ıve. While the REIDIT algorithms provide a
single model of how re-identiﬁcation can occur in a
distributed environment, trail re-identiﬁcation is not the
only manner by which genomic data can be re-identiﬁed.
An earlier re-identiﬁcation model we introduced utilizes
features about the genomic data [15] and simple rela-
tionships that may exist between DNA and clinical in-
formation (i.e., this sample contains a mutation for
cystic ﬁbrosis). Currently, one of the main focuses of
research in personalized medicine is the study of how
variation in an individuals genome aﬀects their clinical
phenotype [1,25]. Though useful for research and clini-
cal healthcare purposes, these same relationships also
pose challenges to personal privacy.
For example, in previous work we demonstrated that
speciﬁc DNA sequences of an individuals genomic data
could be inferred from publicly available longitudinal
clinical information [15]. In the study, we utilized a
subset of the patient proﬁles of the Huntingtons dis-
ease patients described previously. The identities of
Huntingtons disease patients were determinable. The
relation of each persons genomic information to their
publicly available clinical information proceeds as
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determine a small bound for the age of onset of the
disease for the patients. Since there is a strong correla-
tion between the age of onset and the size of the CAG
repeat mutation that causes Huntingtons disease, we
were able to correctly infer the CAG repeat for 19 of 22
patients in the study. It is feasible that the models we
utilized, or other models [13,14], could be employed to
infer the genomic information of individuals diagnosed
with other genetic diseases and thereby re-identify the
genomic information.
6.3. Limitations and future research
Though the REIDIT algorithms provide correct re-
identiﬁcations, they are limited by their assumptions.
First, in the reserved release model assumes that only one
of the data types is reserved. If one location withholds
genomic data, then all locations withhold genomic data.
Yet, if one location withholds genomic data, and a dif-
ferent location withholds identiﬁed data, then both con-
structed tracks will consist of incomplete trails. In this
scenario, trails from either track can have their 0s can be
truthfully ﬂipped to 1s in. The deterministic REIDIT-I
algorithm cannot handle such a scenario. Use of the
REIDIT-I algorithm can result in an increased number of
false negatives or missed re-identiﬁcations. Even worse,
REIDIT-I may cause false re-identiﬁcations, which un-
der the current error-free model is impossible to achieve.
Second, the model assumes that the released data are
error-free. However, this may not be the case. In certain
cases, typographical errors or false recordings of infor-
mation in a database may occur. In this situation, not
only can a 0 in a trail be ﬂipped to a 1, but a 1 in a trail
can correctly be ﬂipped to a 0. Again, the REIDIT-I
algorithm can miss and cause false re-identiﬁcations.
In light of these deﬁciencies, we are developing more
robust trail re-identiﬁcation algorithms. One possible
direction is the development of trail re-identiﬁcation
methods based on record linkage models. Record link-
age has been used in the biomedical community to link
records from one database to records from another
database. In [26], a deterministic record linkage model is
proposed, where feature selection of the best linkage
attributes is determined. More complex record linkage
models incorporate probabilistic models to account for
typographical error [27,28]. For instance, ‘‘John H.
Smith’’ in Database 1 and ‘‘Jon H. Smitth’’ in Database
2 may both be the same individual, but neither John and
Jon, nor Smith and Smitth, are equivalent. Variations
on these probabilistic methods may be useful for de-
signing new trail matching models. For example, con-
sider a simple reserved release: an identiﬁed track with
two trails, s1[1,0,1] and s2[0,1,1], and a DNA track with
two trails, t1[0,0,1] and t2[1,1,1]. If each location has an
equal amount of error in their released data, then nomatches of identiﬁed to DNA trails can be made; both s1
and s2 diﬀer from t1 and t2 by 2 bits. However, when the
ﬁrst location is known to have a high rate of data error
and the remaining locations have little or no error, then
it is more probable that s1 and t1 correspond to the same
entity, and similarly for s2 and t2. Granted, the ability to
make such a decision must be made in the context of the
set of all trails in the tracks.7. Conclusion
In this research, we proved that genomic data can
often be re-identiﬁed in a distributed health environ-
ment. We developed and evaluated several algorithms,
collectively termed RE-Identiﬁcation of Data in Trails
(REIDIT), that re-identify through the use of unique
features in the sets of locations that patients visit. The
REIDIT algorithms demonstrate that anonymity pro-
tection techniques neglecting to incorporate both com-
putational and healthcare factors can be susceptible to
re-identiﬁcation. Moreover, the development of our
models in a computational manner shifts the problem of
anonymity analysis from ad hoc methods into a formal
setting. In the future, to evaluate anonymity protocols it
necessary that researchers attack the problem with
context dependent aspects in mind. With formal models,
privacy protection methods can be tested against the
current array of re-identiﬁcation techniques, such as
trail re-identiﬁcation, to certify anonymity and thereby
guarantee patient privacy.Acknowledgments
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